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The Leviathan Becoming a Cephalophore: Primogeniture and the Transition from 
Sovereignty to Governmentality 
Abstract 
For Foucault, Hobbes is important for the transition from sovereignty to governmentality, but he does not 
always go into great detail how. In “Society Must Be Defended”, Hobbes’s reactions against the political 
historicism of his time lead him to an ahistorical foundation to the state. In Security, Territory, Population, his 
contract is emblematic of the art of government still caught in the logic of sovereignty. Management 
techniques, one of which being inheritance laws like primogeniture, inducing changes in a population’s milieu 
so that its interest is properly directed allow the art of government to escape this logic. Hobbes supports 
primogeniture, but its historical position in the common law makes this support unexpected. This article 
examines the historical context of primogeniture and the reasoning for Hobbes’s support of it in light of 
Foucault’s claims about him in order to give more precision to those claims. The result is that primogeniture as 
a law of nature produces the family as an interested unit of the population. Yet this interest is itself historicized, 
so Hobbes’s attempt to de-historicize politics did not fully succeed. 
Keywords: Hobbes, Foucault, Sovereignty, Governmentality, Primogeniture, Natural Law. 
Leviathan Bir Cephalophore Dönüşürken: İlk Çocuk ve Egemenlikten 
Yönetimselliğe Geçiş 
Öz 
Foucault, egemenlikten yönetimselliğe geçiş konusunda Hobbes’u önemli bulsa da Hobbes’un önemi 
konusunda detaylı bir açıklamayı çoğunlukla sunmamaktadır. Hobbes’un kendi dönemindeki tarihçilik karşıtı   
tepkileri Toplum Savunulmalıdır (Society Must Be Defended) eserinde   Foucault’yu devletin ahistorik 
temellerine yöneltmiştir. Güvenlik, Bölge, Nüfus (Security, Territory, Population) eserinde sözleşme   kavramı 
yönetim sanatının sembollerinden olup hala egemenlik mantığı çerçevesinde konumlanmaktadır. İlk çocuğa 
(primogeniture) dair miras hukukunu da kapsayan idare yöntemleri milieunun çıkarını doğru bir şekilde 
yönlendirecek şekilde nüfusun milieusunda değişimlere neden   olmakta ve böylece yönetim sanatının bu 
mantıktan kurtulmasını mümkün   kılmaktadır. Hobbes ilk çocuk fikrini desteklemektedir fakat fikrin kamu 
hukukundaki tarihsel konumu bağlamında bu beklenmedik bir   destektir. Bu makale ilk çocuğun tarihsel 
bağlamını ve Hobbes’un verdiği desteğin dayandığı akıl yürütmeyi Foucault’nun iddiaları ışığında irdelemekte 
ve bu iddiaları daha belirgin bir şekilde sunmayı   amaçlamaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bir doğa yasası olarak ilk 
çocuğun aileyi nüfusun hissedar bir birimi olarak üretmesidir. Fakat bu hissedarlığın kendisi de 
tarihselleşmiştir, dolayısıyla Hobbes’un   siyaseti tarihsellikten çıkarma girişimi tam olarak gerçekleşmemiştir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Hobbes, Foucault, Egemenlik, Yönetimsellik, İlk Çocuk (Primogeniture), Doğal Yasa. 
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The cephalophore is a theme in Christian art and literature of a saint carrying his 
own head.
1
 Its origins are Saint John Chrysostom’s fourth-century homily on Saints 
Juventinus and Maximinus and the legends surrounding the life of Saint Denis of Paris 
(Walter 2003: 143). The former were Christian soldiers in Julian the Apostate’s army 
who lamented the emperor’s persecutions at a military drinking party. Put in jail and 
their property confiscated, their prison became a gathering place for Christians, so 
Julian sent people to tempt them with pardon and promotion. They refused, indeed 
resigned their ranks, and Julian had them beheaded. They, says Chrysostom, presented 
their heads at the gates of heaven as a sign of their martyrdom (Chrysostom 2006: 91-
99). The latter, often erroneously conflated with Dionysius the Areopagite, was one of 
seven bishops sent to Gaul by Pope Fabian in the third century to counter Emperor 
Decius’ persecutions (Tours 1974: I.30). For his effectiveness in converting a 
nobleman, Denis, along with Saints Rusticus and Eleutherius, was scourged, enchained, 
and imprisoned. The next day, having already been cooked on an iron grill and placed 
before unfed animals, he was roasted in an oven, but none of these things killed or even 
harmed him. Again imprisoned after being nailed to a cross, he served communion to 
his fellow inmates. Finally, Denis, Rusticus, and Eleutherius were beheaded. Denis then 
stood, picked up his head, and walked to the top of Montmartre, where he is buried 
(Voraigne 2012: 626). His beheading is depicted on the north portal of the Basilica of 
Saint-Denis, the burial place for French kings for eight hundred years. 
In a 1977 interview, to the suggestion that the great political theories have always 
presented an enormous gap between those who have and do not have power, Michael 
Foucault replies that political theory remains obsessed with the question of sovereignty. 
Despite the experiences of Charles, I and Louis XVI, despite the spread of non-
monarchical systems of government and the theories espousing them, for Foucault the 
king’s head remains on his shoulders (Foucault 1980: 121). 
Nevertheless, and precisely because of Foucault’s historical analyses of power, 
perhaps we ought not be so quick to see a king or sovereign before us. Perhaps a more 
appropriate image is the cephalophore, the remarkable image of a man carrying his 
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head, an act whereby he gains or is rewarded for his saintly power. To make this case, I 
turn to one of those great theories of sovereignty, that of Thomas Hobbes. 
Foucault clearly sees Hobbes as important to the history of Western political 
philosophy but rarely goes into detail. As Hanssen (2000: 114-115) and Spieker (2011: 
190-191) point out, Hobbes is Foucault’s unnamed adversary in Discipline and Punish 
insofar as the former thinks of power as a possession or commodity and the latter 
examines its deployment (Foucault 1995: 26-27).
2
 Yet the only mention of Hobbes in 
The History of Sexuality I is as a transitional figure who placed a condition on 
sovereignty’s subtractive power over life and death: Sovereignty can claim my natural 
rights only to protect its artificial life, which in turn protects my natural and artificial 
life (Foucault 1990: 135-136). Meanwhile, in “Society Must Be Defended”, Foucault is 
interested more in how modern politics incorporated war into the domestic sphere and 
less in Hobbes as such (Foucault 2003: 89-99). For this reason, it seems, much of the 
literature on Foucault’s understanding of Hobbes focuses on war (Hanssen 2000: 124-
130; Kelly 2009: 51-54; Polat 2010; Spieker 2011; Crano 2011). Security, Territory, 
Population, however, cites Hobbes as an example of the early stage of the art of 
government that still thought of the law as its primary instrument rather than as a tactic 
(Foucault 2007: 103). 
The understandable focus on war might lose sight of how exactly Hobbes figures 
in this early stage of the art of government, of the transition from sovereignty to 
governmentality. In sovereignty, i.e., the right to take life, power asserts both law and 
the punishment for disobeying it. Governmentality is a particular if now dominant form 
of biopower, a manner of power taking up the biological features of the human qua 
species through a set of mechanisms. These mechanisms are apparatuses of security and 
involve, among other things, understanding individuals’ desires as unchangeable. 
Within a political system as a whole and according to subgroups within the system, 
however, one can gain knowledge of the population. The population does not desire, but 
its general interest is discerned through knowledge of the different subgroups’ interests 
and individuals’ desires. Policies can then induce changes in the population’s actions 
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not through law and punishment, as in sovereignty, but through campaigns and other 
techniques that access both individuals’ desires and the population’s general interest. 
Law becomes one of these techniques. The population’s surface, upon which these 
techniques act, is the public. Of Foucault’s three definitions of governmentality, the 
most important here is the first, insofar as it highlights the centrality of the economy 
(Foucault 1990: 136, 137; 2007: 5, 44, 1, 23, 70-75, 62-63, 105-106, 99, 108).
3
 
Governmentality, then, as a type of biopower, is a particular way to apply security 
apparatuses in order to induce changes in the population, applying them to the economy. 
Tracing out how Hobbes is transitional between sovereignty and governmentality 
could bolster Foucault’s claims despite critiques that he ignores Hobbes scholarship 
(Hanssen 2000: 125). Foucault’s understanding of power as deployed rather than as a 
commodity means it operates through technologies of violence in sovereignty and of 
population-level surveillance and biological controls in governmentality, all developing 
in tandem with knowledge (Foucault 2003: 240, 245-246; Kelly 2009: 43-44). Here I 
ask what knowledge allows Hobbes to become ‘Hobbes’, an author with the function of 
effecting the transition from sovereignty to governmentality (Foucault 1977: 130-131; 
Crano 2011: 159, 166-167). Hanssen (2000: 124) identifies the three fictions that, for 
Foucault, allow Hobbes to generate these effects: subjects’ subjection, power’s 
unification, and natural law’s originariness. Examining Hobbes’s defense of 
primogeniture, where the eldest child inherits the whole of an estate, will show how 
these fictions operate within his system as a technique that opens onto governmentality. 
First, though, I lay out more explicitly what Foucault says about Hobbes in “Society…” 
and Security. Then I contextualize primogeniture in English history before discussing 
Hobbes’s position on it. Because Foucault is mostly thinking of Leviathan in his 
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What Is Hobbes to Foucault? 
In “Society…”, Hobbes emerges as both reactionary and revolutionary by 
resisting alike the political historicism of the royalists, parliamentarians, and the 
Levellers and Diggers.
5
 For Foucault, Hobbes seeks to end the conflict between 
Normans and Saxons at work since 1066, to give England an ahistorical foundation. 
Royalists claimed that James I’s divine right to rule was secured through the Norman 
Conquest, meaning England was a possession of the crown and Saxons had no 
proprietary right beyond royal grant. Colonization further legitimated this claim to right 
by conquest. On the parliamentarian side, William was the legitimate successor to 
Edward the Confessor, so his sovereignty was Saxon-approved and subject to those 
laws, customs, and right. The laws and proprietary claims later instituted by the 
Normans to secure their sovereignty were the illegitimate conquest. For the Levellers 
and Diggers, 1066 was indeed a conquest and therefore illegitimate, as are all law, 
property, and rule since they exploit the people in a conspiracy to extend and make 
permanent conquest. Saxon rule was as guilty of this as Norman (Foucault 2003: 102-
109). 
On Foucault’s reading, Hobbes wants to end this political deployment of historical 
interpretation. Our natural equality in strength and intelligence means we must display 
what strength we have and a willingness to engage in war, so the state of nature’s war of 
all against all is as much theater as battle. Sovereignty is established by the calculation 
to institute it, the violence that acquires it, or the natural power of mother over child 
(i.e., original or natural dominion). It does not matter which (Foucault 2003: 110-111, 
91-97). Hobbes is, then, reactionary in arguing against the infiltration of history into the 
discussion of right but revolutionary in repositioning the right to rule away from 
inheritance, tradition, or divine justification.
6
 
Foucault does not say much in “Society…” as to how Hobbes effects this 
transition beyond noting that war and nature are de-historicized. In Security, though, 
Hobbes is the exemplary contributor to modern contract theory understood as part of the 
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literature on the art of government, the seventeenth century’s nascent governmentality 
that remained caught within the logic of sovereignty. Historically, the Thirty Years War, 
uprisings, and financial crises prevented the spread of governmentality and its economic 
administration over life. Let us add the English Civil Wars to this list. Structurally, the 
art of government was tied to sovereignty in two ways important. First, it focused its 
thinking on upward and downward analogies of management of state, household, and 
self such that the head of the household served as a model for the other managers. 
Second, these early attempts at the art of government, mercantilism being the clearest 
example, took the law as their main instrument, leading to a plethora of self-defeating 
regulations. As result, contract theory developed within the framework of law until 
governmentality could emerge from out of the art of government (Foucault 2007: 101-
103, 93-95, 33). 
Physiocracy, being more circumspect than mercantilism about imposing laws and 
regulations since it understands the population as a set of procedures to be managed 
according to their natures, allows for this metamorphosis.
7
 Of the three ways Foucault 
mentions to manage a population, I focus mainly on the first: understanding the 
variables that induce differences in population (climate; the degree of commerce; tax, 
marriage, and inheritance laws; religion and local mores; and the level of subsistence). 
Almost none of these are in sovereignty’s control. At the end, I look to the second way: 
knowing that individuals’ desires cannot be changed or suppressed by force, but can be 
given a milieu within which to move so as to produce a general interest. Specifically, I 
examine one set of the laws that can induce differences in population, those concerning 
inheritance. As laws, they can be controlled by sovereignty. They are thus techniques in 
the transition to governmentality. Foucault cites primogeniture as one of these laws 
(Foucault 2007: 60-74, 20-21). Hobbes supports primogeniture in a way that can shed 
light on how he contributes to the transition. However, his support is not a given 
because of primogeniture’s position in post-Conquest English history, the political 
deployment of which Foucault argues Hobbes is desperate to end. Thus, a brief look at 
its historical position is needed. 
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What Is Primogeniture? 
Primogeniture is at least as old as ancient Mesopotamia. In Europe, it was 
common among feudal nobles. By the sixteenth century, it was especially common in 
England and Scandinavia (Bertocchi 2017). Once feudal duties no longer involved 
military obligations in seventeenth-century England, noble wealth became more aligned 
with income from land, giving rise to the gentry (Hill 1982: 41, 12-13). 
This practice was mostly, though not completely, introduced into England by the 
Normans. While they also brought their practices to Italy and Syria, these were most 
systematically applied in England. Following their introduction, fiefdoms—land held on 
the fee of military service to the king—became hereditary estates. From the twelfth 
century, a new fief could be transmitted to anyone except the father of the original 
grantee, but not after the first generation. For a time after 1066, the moral though not 
legal or juridical obligation of a fief’s heir to make provision for his siblings resulted in 
the system called parage, where the eldest son alone bore responsibility for services and 
honors to the lord while his younger brothers held portions of the original estate through 
him, sometimes paying him homage. However, by the twelfth century the fief was no 
longer primarily a source of services for the lord, but of revenue. The division and 
partition of honors, duties, and tax revenue was recognized as detrimental to the original 
lord’s rule and wealth, so primogeniture was enforced (Bloch 1978: 200-207). 
Before 1540, if an estate holder died without living relatives, the land would pass 
to the crown according to the common law doctrine of escheat. Otherwise, 
primogeniture was in force. That year, Parliament passed the Statute of Wills, allowing 
a testator to allocate the inheritance in his will (Rathby 1963: 744-746). In the early 
seventeenth century, a landowner dying with a minor heir meant, if the family did not or 
could not buy from the king a wardship for the heir, the crown would choose a courtier, 
whose loyalty would only rarely be with the family. The failed Great Contract of 1610 
proposed to end this practice (Hill 1982: 41-42). By the middle of the seventeenth 
century, strict settlement, where the eldest son became tenant to the land upon marriage, 
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was the most common practice in wills and recognized by the common law (Bonfield 
1983: 9, 53-54). Though in practice identical to primogeniture, strict settlement is a 
volitional act, while primogeniture had become the default custom for intestate lands 
(Bonfield 2018: 482).  
For my purposes, two aspects to this history are most worth considering. First, the 
introduction of primogeniture is part of the introduction of Norman domination over 
England’s Saxon population. Whether that domination is understood as beginning in 
1066 or as a later betrayal of William’s legitimate succession to the throne—i.e., 
whether seen through a royalist or parliamentarist lens—its existence is part of the 
legacy of sovereignty. Second, it seems never to have been a law, strictly speaking, but 
to have gained force as a custom through the common law system. The common law 
existed explicitly for property-holding freemen and was often in opposition to the 
crown’s statutory system (Hill 1982: 22, 37-40, 55-56, 87-88). Given Hobbes’s 
consistent disdain for custom gaining the force of law of its own accord (Hobbes 1983: 
14.15; 1996: 184-185; 1997a: 96; 2008: 17.11), his support for primogeniture appears 
odd. However, what leads him to this support gives us a more specific understanding of 
how he is transitional between sovereignty and governmentality. 
 
What Is Primogeniture to Hobbes? 
In Leviathan, primogeniture is, with first seizure, part of the fourteenth law of 
nature, itself part of a group, with the twelfth and thirteenth, of natural laws on the use 
and distribution of things. The eleventh law, on equity, and the sixteenth through 
eighteenth laws, on arbitration and partiality, are also important here. Primogeniture and 
first seizure are the two kinds of the natural form of lot, distinct from the arbitrary form, 
where competitors for a thing agree on its possession. The twelfth law says that what 
cannot be divided should, if possible, be enjoyed in proportion according to right or in 
common. Since some things cannot be commonly enjoyed even in proportion, the 
thirteenth law declares that lot should determine their possession. These laws flow from 
the eleventh, that someone entrusted with arbitrating a controversy should deal equally 
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with the competitors. The sixteenth law demands that competitors submit their rights to 
this arbitrator. Meanwhile, the seventeenth law prohibits someone from arbitrating their 
own case and the eighteenth forbids anyone arbitrating a case wherein they have an 
interest (Hobbes 1996: 108-109). Thus, nature is the arbiter of controversy over 
indivisible things that cannot be proportionately or commonly shared and whose 
competitors cannot agree to a judge. It is the distributor of equity. 
What, though, is a law of nature? A law binds us to an action, impeding our 
motion, while a right is a liberty, the absence of impediment. Nature is God’s art as the 
creation and governance of the world. A law of nature, then, is an impediment 
governing natural motion forbidding self-destruction. We discover these laws by reason 
and reasoning is the calculation of consequences that build on each other (Hobbes 1996: 
91, 9, 31, 33). Thus, the laws of nature are the discovery of calculating the 
consequences to our actions in a world governed by the divine art. 
However, Hobbes also calls these laws theorems since they are not commands 
from one with that right via acquisition, institution, or natural dominion.
8
 If we take 
them as divine commands, though, we can understand them as laws. To command is to 
express one’s will that another do something for one’s own benefit and solely because it 
is one’s will, while to counsel is to suggest an action to another on at least the pretense 
of being for that other’s benefit and to give reasons for the action. We cannot covenant 
with God save through supernatural revelation or lieutenants, and so cannot transfer our 
natural rights thereto since we cannot know if our promises are accepted. Thus, we 
cannot be commanded by God as we can by a sovereign. Still, children also cannot be 
covenanted with except through personation, yet a mother has dominion over a child in 
nature by its consent to being nourished and by a dependence on her will so extreme 
that this will is its own (Hobbes 1996: 111, 176-177, 97, 113, 139-140). The laws of 
nature, as theorems derived by a calculation of the consequences of our actions in the 
world governed by God, can then be understood as divine commands that we not harm 
ourselves. Our will to live is also God’s, our consent to life the sign that we will it, too. 
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The punishment for disobedience is the destruction or making miserable of our lives, so 
these laws are divine commands as much as rational counsels.
9
 
Still, why convert primogeniture from a custom into a law of nature? For Hobbes, 
civil law is the commonwealth’s rules commanded by the sovereign. Custom, if not 
contrary to the law of nature, gains the force of law not through time but from the 
sovereign’s judgment according to the eleventh law of nature, on equity. It does not 
gain the force of law via time because knowledge of it is only historical knowledge of 
fact, not the conditional knowledge of consequences required for science or philosophy. 
It is, at most, a compound experience connected to remembrance, one form of regulated 
trains of thought whereby we seek effects. Judgments about it would be an 
understanding or a prudence that animals also have and so would not involve reason’s 
calculation of consequences. Common law judges, then, are not judges proper, but 
counsellors who must give reasons to sovereignty why a custom ought to be judged a 
law. Judges, including judges of natural laws, are authorized by sovereignty to interpret, 
which all laws require (Hobbes 1996: 183-184, 60, 16, 20-22, 19, 186-197, 190-192). 
To convert primogeniture into a law of nature, then, is to shift it away from the 
accumulation of historical fact and into the rational knowledge of consequences, to 
subject it to the interpretation of an authorized judge as the expression of a divine will 
that equals our own. 
Its historical origin in the Norman Conquest is irrelevant, even if we claim that a 
commonwealth by acquisition is illegitimate, because the divine art of the world’s 
equitable governance legitimates primogeniture. Reason can know this legitimacy 
because primogeniture is a natural form in a natural law. It is a natural form because age 
and time, the foundations of memory and experience, are also the foundations of the 
prudential trains of thought that allow us to seek future effects. Prudence is most 
assured with the most experience because more experience means having accumulated 
more signs, i.e., more knowledge and memory of one event following another, allowing 
the one with the most experience to guess the future the best. Experience is distributed 
equally to all by time if they put in equal effort (Hobbes 1996: 22-23, 87). The eldest 
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child, being eldest, will have accumulated the most signs, so reason dictates that, absent 
a will stating otherwise or evidence of unequal effort, this is the child to be preferred for 
prudence’s sake. Doubly natural and doubly equitable, primogeniture is no mere 
custom, even if custom and common law happened upon it and counsel its adoption to 
sovereignty. Nature dictates it and reason discerns it from our natural equality and will 
to equal distribution. Nature, governed by God, is the authorized arbitrator here, a fair 
and impartial distributor interpreting a will to equity that is also our own. 
 
Primogeniture, Governmentality, and Family History 
In converting primogeniture from a custom into a law of nature, Hobbes did not 
just eradicate historically grounded arguments over property and inheritance rights. He 
also shifted the justification for primogeniture’s enforcement away from sovereignty 
and toward nature and reason. Both our own will to equity and our rational calculation 
of the consequences of allowing intestate property to be distributed according to 
something other than age, experience, and prudence tell us that primogeniture is the 
only natural and peaceful form of its distribution. In other words, converting this custom 
into a natural law gives sovereignty a technique for producing a general interest, uses 
governmentality’s first way to manage a population such that it becomes the second. 
Landholders, if they are rational, should now generally understand that it is in their 
interest, their will to natural equity, to follow primogeniture. 
Yet if Foucault is not wrong that Hobbes sought to de-historicize politics, the 
latter failed to do so completely. The upward and downward movements of 
management are broken in that primogeniture as a natural law is not justified on the 
model of the family, which is parallel to the corporation in structure and dependence on 
the sovereign (Hobbes 1996: 162-163). However, the family becomes a public upon 
which state management takes hold of the population for the state’s economic stability 
(Foucault 2007: 104-105). As such a surface, the family’s rational interest, qua familial, 
includes parents’ and ancestors’ desires. These historical and historicized desires 
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become the grounds for the human forms of understanding expressed in language 
through strict settlement or other forms of entail. 
As governmentality evolves from the art of government, this interest is recognized 
in John Locke’s naturalization of property and the legitimate power parents can hold 
over adult children via inheritance through to the American neoliberal economist Gary 
Becker’s argument that parents who desire their children care for them in old age 
produce guilt in those children and that social welfare systems for the elderly break up 
families. Over the course of this evolution, different strands of governmentality 
develop. Again, governmentality, as the application to the economy of security 
apparatuses that induce changes in a population, is a specific type of biopower, or 
power’s way of taking up the biological features of the human species, distinct from the 
individual humans who compose it. From the eighteenth century on, governmentality 
emerges as the main form of political organization, taking on more specific expressions 
in liberalism, classical economics, Marxism, Keynesianism, and neoliberalism. This last 
strand is further divided between its German and American styles, with the American 
distinguished by the concept of human capital: individual economic and non-economic 
behavior understood as investments to be returned to that individual, whether as a 
monetary wage or in some other form (Foucault 2007: 109, 48, 76-77; 2008: 101-184, 
215-289). 
For Locke, children are obligated by nature to honor their parents, but not beyond 
minority. However, ownership beyond one’s own use is justified since both property is 
founded on bodily labor, which adds value to what would be wasted without it, and 
money constituted by useless but durable materials. Having so grounded the right to 
estates and the right to bestow them as they see fit and/or within custom, fathers can 
exert power and control over sons into adulthood, as their fathers exerted over them, to 
which the sons voluntarily submit (Locke 1690: §§72, 27, 46, 50, 73).  
Three hundred years into governmentality’s development, the hold of ancestral 
interests having slackened, Becker emphasizes the need for economic theory to take 
account of guilt in parent-child relationships. Making their children feel obligated to 
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care for them in old age through guilt is, he claims, a technique for parents to secure 
themselves against risks like failing health and unemployment. Doing so allows them to 
consume more in their own old age than they lose in the reduction of their children’s 
consumption. The guilt instilled in these children does more to explain their later 
behavior toward their parents than either altruism or self-interest. Anticipation of this 
care expected thanks to guilt means parents may be more loving toward their children 
than they might otherwise be, although instilling guilt also means the parents do not 
invest as much in their children’s human capital as they perhaps could. Thus, social 
programs that help the elderly weaken families’ emotional ties (Becker 1992: 50-51). 
Between Locke and Becker, then, we see an increasing entwinement of familial 
and governmental interest. Locke’s naturalization of property may separate the 
sovereign’s power over property and the right to bestow estates as fathers see fit, but the 
power to preserve the power to bestow estates falls to the government, which oversees 
political unity (Locke 1690: §87). Becker may merely analyze the effects of social and 
legal old-age programs on generational family ties, but the large-scale consequences of 
these effects are in policymakers’ interests in terms of what changes in those ties can be 
induced (Becker 1992: 52). 
Arguments against primogeniture and entails hinge on the relationship between 
family and political interest. Adam Smith’s arguments center on its inefficiency. He 
considers the equal distribution of an estate to be a natural law and argues that 
primogeniture developed as a temporary security for monarchical holdings. By the 
eighteenth century, however, property rights are well secured, so large estates, 
especially those with unproductive land, are unnecessary. Entails for Smith developed 
as a way to secure familial lineage and the stability of small political holdings, but are 
grounded on the claim that future generations are tied to their pasts. Social and political 
interest, however, is in the improvement of production, and those with large estates 
rarely improve their lands in this way. Thus, small estates are preferred to large for the 
wealth of a nation (Smith 1976: I.407-411, I.1). Historical and historicized family 
interest is here in conflict with political and Smith recommends changes in law such 
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that the milieu for landholders allows them to voluntarily make changes in line with 
political interest. 
Primogeniture is also recognized as a technique or tactic of domination by noble 
and gentry over commoner (Hill 1982: 38), eldest siblings over younger (Jamoussi 
2011: 32-41), and husbands and their families over wives (Mill 2002: 155-157). No 
longer, as in sovereignty, is political power invoked to justify the maintenance of an 
estate. Instead, in the name of historically grounded familial stability expressed in the 
estate, political and economic power is exerted against those with fewer rights thanks to 
that same political and economic power. 
By transferring it away from custom, the Hobbesian de-historicization of 
primogeniture historicizes the family, which is no longer precisely blood, no longer a 
consanguineous structure in a relationship to the sovereign enforced by techniques of 
violence (Foucault 1990: 147). Family history as the historicization of economic interest 
becomes entwined with the sovereign’s obligation to guarantee meum and tuum. Neither 
locus of military or financial obligation nor model for self- and state management, 
through primogeniture-become-natural-law the family is produced and reproduced as 
the historicized public unit of self-interested wealth maintenance. The landholder’s 
particular desires are modified into family interest, which is debated as with or against 
the state’s desire for the population’s general interest. Hobbes’s de-historicization of 
primogeniture by converting it into a natural law discerned by reason is one way he 
becomes ‘Hobbes’, a figure who circumscribes, determines, and articulates a realm of 
discourse (Foucault 1977: 130). 
Through the de-historicizing naturalization of primogeniture, the king, beheading 
himself, becomes a cephalophore. As Foucault points out, sovereignty never 
disappeared but in the very developments leading to governmentality and its more 
specific strands became all the more important (Foucault 2007: 106-107). Shifting 
primogeniture away from custom appears to lessen royal power insofar as the obligation 
to maintain an estate as a whole is no longer grounded in protection and violence. Yet 
this same shift that makes ancestral and generational family property interests both 
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more the focus of governance and more tied to government. The very appearance of 
sovereignty’s disappearance is how it keeps its power, here by tying itself to questions 
of generational family estate maintenance. Locke, Smith, and others thus did not, contra 
Hobbes, domesticate the political (Paris 2004: 50). Rather, following Hobbes, they 
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1. I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions on an 
earlier draft. 
2. When not discussing established political forms, either civil or ecclesiastical, 
Hobbes consistently translates ‘power’ from or into Latin as potentia. In De Corpore, it 
is the result of accidents, his name for what belongs to neither a thing as such nor its 
parts but without which it is destroyed, by which a thing causes acts or effects (Hobbes 
1839, 1997b: 3.3, 9.4, 10.1). Leviathan defines power, divided into natural or 
instrumental, as the medium through which we obtain what seems good (Hobbes 1841: 
68-69; 1996: 62-63). In addition, in The Elements of Law power is either the bodily and 
mental faculties summarized by defining humans as rational animals or the use of the 
mental power of conception to further one’s faculties (Hobbes 2008: 1.4-8, 8.3-4). I do 
not have the space to develop this argument in full, though it would be worthwhile in 
light of Foucault’s later discussion of the milieu (Foucault 2007: 20-23), but if 
power/potentia in Hobbes is that through which one acts, it may not be a commodity if 
that means something held or not. Fully developing this argument would build on the 
insight that potentia indicates power as constitutive of or as a process through which 
something enacts itself (Polat 2010: 333-334). 
3. The second definition focuses on the pre-eminence of government over other 
forms of power and the third on the governmentalization of the state as a result of the 
processes in question (Foucault 2007: 108-109). 
4. A comparison with what Hobbes says about primogeniture in Hobbes (1983) 
and Hobbes (2008) (see also Hobbes (2017)) would be worthwhile, but I will follow 
Foucault and stay with Leviathan. In addition, the aspect of primogeniture that most 
concerns me is not royal succession, but estate inheritance more broadly. Thus, I also do 
not refer to works like Hobbes (2005). 
5. For royalist historicism, see James I (1918); for parliamentarist, Coke (2003); 
and for that of the Levellers and Diggers, Hart (2015) and Winstanley (2011), 
respectively. 
6. Many of Foucault’s claims are backed up by Hill (1982: 51-57). One 
difference, though, is in the analysis of the motivations for the era’s turn to history. In 
Foucault, it sometimes seems like a deliberate act to think through the contestations 
over sovereignty and law. Hill argues that the turn to history occurred because the 
participants did not have the conceptual apparatuses to engage the problems they were 
facing. 
7. Without entering into the debate over what kind of economic thinker Hobbes 
is, he can be considered a mercantilist in Foucault’s terms. Corporations in Leviathan 
are lawful, private, regular systems dependent on laws that emanate from the absolute 
regular system of sovereignty and whose gain is distinct from national wealth (Hobbes 
1996: 155, 160-162). Gain in this sense means he is neither a physiocrat on Foucault’s 
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understanding (Foucault 2007: 33-34) nor a political economist or capitalist (Smith 
1976: I.1-2). For a review of the debate, see Taylor (2010). Also see Colella (1982). 
8. There is a debate in Hobbes scholarship whether natural laws are laws proper. 
Gauthier (2001: 263-264, 280, 282-283) understands them as primarily theorems, and 
so not laws, for two main reasons: first, reason’s discerning them does not give them the 
status of commands, and second, if natural laws are obligatory only under civil law, 
subjects are left in a circle of obligation between natural laws obeyed because civil, civil 
laws obeyed because from the sovereign, and sovereign obeyed because authorized by 
subjects from out of the natural laws themselves. Undersud (2014: 704, 708, 715) 
argues that natural laws have no force without connection to civil law, and thus are not 
of truly laws, but the grounds for civil law and its force. Cooper (2018: 144, 168, 179), 
however, claims their legal status because even civil law is grounded on God’s power, 
making it a crime not to pursue the human good of peace. 
9. The infant’s consent to original dominion never seems to come up in debates 
over the status of natural laws, but it would argue against Gauthier and Undersud in that 
discerning them only articulates them what is already in force and against Gauthier in 
that obligation has already been signified before becoming subjects. However, I see 
nothing in this consent to life that, à la Cooper (2018: 7, 70, 80-81, 88-92), argues 
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